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COMMENTS
FINAL DETERMINATION OF DOMICIL IN THE
UNITED STATES*
The death in 1930 of Dr. John T. Dorrance, Campbell Soup
magnate, has raised a question of the utmost importance to per-
sons who desire their estates to be subjected to but one in-
heritance tax and to states desirous of replenishing diminished
treasuries by collecting a tax upon every possible estate. Upon
the death of Dr. Dorrance, both New Jersey and Pennsylvania
assessed an inheritance tax against that part of the estate which
consisted of shares of stock in the Campbell Soup Co. which was
valued in excess of a hundred and fifteen million dollars. Be-
fore any litigation arose out of this situation, those most inter-
ested in the estate obviously preferred to pay the New Jersey in-
heritance tax rather than the Pennsylvania tax, the difference
between the two amounting to five million dollars. Indeed, this
was clearly the desire of the decedent before his death, as he
had taken every precaution known to the legal profession at that
time to insure that his estate would be subjected only to the
New Jersey tax. Plans of the decedent, however, were upset
when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1932 found that
Dr. Dorrance had been domiciled at his death in Pennsylvania
and that the estate was thus subject to the death duties of that
state.1 The estate petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania. The writ was denied without opinion.2
It was not to be supposed, however, that New Jersey would
readily relinquish its claim to the twelve million dollars tax
which it had imposed upon the estate. Originally desiring to
pay the New Jersey tax, the estate, of course, now resists it.
Having exhausted every possibility of avoiding the Pennsylvania
tax, the executors can at best now hope to avoid paying the New
* Reprinted from Pennsylvania Bar Quarterly, April, 1934.
'In re Dorrance's Estate (1932), 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303, noted in
(1933) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1177.
2 (1933) 288 U. S. 617.
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Jersey tax also. The Prerogative Court of New Jersey, on Feb-
ruary 7, 1934, decided that Dr. Dorrance was domiciled in New
Jersey at his death.3 Persons interested in the estate of Dr.
Dorrance are now in the position of being required to insist that,
in spite of the declarations of the decedent and the contention of
the parties in the Pennsylvania litigation, Dr. Dorrance was
domiciled at his death in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
It may be assumed that the estate will again attempt to invoke
a review by the United States Supreme Court in an effort to
obtain a ruling from that body on the one and only issue in the
entire litigation, namely, the domicil of the decedent at his death.
The Supreme Court is unequivocally committed to the propo-
sition that one and only one inheritance tax may be imposed
upon an estate.4 Dr. Dorrance's estate consists predominantly
of shares of stock, and it is the domicil of the decedent at his
death which affords jurisdiction to impose death duties thereon. 5
In a series of recent decisions,6 the Supreme Court has been at
great pains to clarify its position on multiple taxation, and in
so doing has made important changes in the law. 7 The Court
has, it seems, sought to select some one essential contact as the
determining factor in tax cases. Thus, just as in the case of
land, it is the state where the land is that may tax; so in the case
of chattels, it is only the state where the chattels are;8 in the
case of intangible personal property, it is only the domicil of
the decendent that may exact death duties.9 This is consistent
with the usual technique in the Conflict of Laws. Such a tech-
nique is reasonably satisfactory because the so-called "contact
points" are of such a character that, in a given case, one and
only one such place can, by hypothesis, exist. Thus, as everyone
knows, a person can have at any given time but one domicil.10
3 In re Dorrance's Estate (1934), 170 Atl. 601.
4 Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota (1930), 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sp.
Ct. 98; Baldwin v. Missouri (1930), 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sp. Ct. .54; Beidler v.
South Carolina Tax Commission (1930), 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sp. Ct. 436;
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine (1932), 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sp. Ct. 174.
5 First Natl Bank of Boston v. Maine (1932), 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup.
Ct. 174.
6 See supra, note 4.
7 Cf. Blackstone v. Miller (1903), 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sp. Ct. 277, with
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 4.
s Frick v. Pennsylvania (1924) 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sp. Ct. 603.
9 Blodgett v. Silberman (1928), 277 U. S. 1, 48 Spj Ct. 410; First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Maine (1932), 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sp. Ct. 174.
10 Restatement of Conflict of Laws (P. F. Draft No. 1), § 13.
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Since the only state which has jurisdiction to impose an inher-
itance tax on intangibles is the state of the domicil of the de-
cedent at his death, a multiple inheritance tax is thus theo-
retically impossible.
But the present litigation raises the question what court is to
determine the decedent's domicil in a given case and what is the
effect of such determination when made. Of course, the court
in which the question is raised must pass upon it. This is an
obvious fact and not a rule of law. The question is then pre-
sented, what law will the forum employ in determining the de-
cedent's domicil. As a matter of statement of the law, this is not
of great importance in as much as practically every common
law state adopts the same formula to determine domicil in most
cases. This is usually expressed by the rule that a domicil of
choice is where a man's home is unless he has more than one
home," in which case his domicil is where his principal home
is.1 2 As a matter of fact, there is probably very little authority
for the proposition that the court at the forum applies its own
law of domicil. 13 It is also true that this is quite probably not
sound Conflict of Laws technique. If other analogies in the
Conflict of Laws are followed, the law of the forum will apply
the rule of law of the state in which acts or events happen which
are claimed to give a person a domicil in that state, just as the
court in the forum will look to the law of the state in which
any other act or event happens to determine the legal effect of
that act. The actual cases will probably support this formula
as much or perhaps more than the rule that the forum applies
its own law. Since, however, the law of most common law
states is in all but a few rare particulars the same rational rule,
the problem involves only an application of the rule to the facts
in any given case.
Domicil is, of course, a legal conclusion and not a fact. It
represents a shorthand method of expressing a number of legal
consequences which result from certain facts. The important
facts in the determination of a domicil of choice are the person's
physical presence in a state and an intention to make his home
11 Ibid, § 14.
12 Ibid, § 26.
13 In practically all the cases, the court does not purport to apply the
law of any particular state. It simply determines the domicil of the per-
son in question upon such principles as can be obtained from the available
authorities.
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there.14 It is the mental factor in the situation and the nebulous
character of the concept "home" that makes it difficult to pre-
dict a person's domicil in many situations. In the determination
of what constitutes a "home" or, if a person has more than one
home, his "principal home," no rule of thumb can be laid down.
A number of variables are to be considered. These variables
have been described from time to time, and what is perhaps an
adequate summary is set forth in the Restatement of Conflict
of Laws of the American Law Institute. 0 It is there stated that
among other things important consideration is to be given to:
(1) the physical characteristics of the dwelling place, (2) the
time spent therein, (3) the things done therein, (4) the persons
and things therein, (5) the actor's mental attitude toward the
place, (6) the actor's intention when absent to return there, and
(7) elements of other dwelling places of the actor. The opinion
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discloses facts which make
the finding of the Pennsylvania domicil an extremely plausible
one. Mr. Dorrance spent a preponderating amount of time at
his Philadelphia dwelling as compared to a very small amount
of time in New Jersey. Mr. Dorrance's immediate family lived
with him in Philadelphia whereas his mother and sister occu-
pied the New Jersey dwelling. The amount of money spent to
maintain the Pennsylvania establishment in one year exceeded
the amount of money expended to maintain the New Jersey resi-
dence by an amount in excess of eighty-five thousand dollars.
on the other hand, Dr. Dorrance frequently asserted that he
was domiciled in New Jersey, made his will on the assumption
that he was there domiciled, and obviously desired a domicil in
New Jersey. The Pennsylvania court, following orthodox prin-
ciples, ignored the decedent's desire and attached weight to his
actions.
With so many indefinable factors to be taken into account in
determining domicil, it is not difficult to understand how the
New Jersey court arrived at the conclusion that Dr. Dorrance
was domiciled there. This, the court felt at liberty to do. While
it is true that in some instances even jurisdictional facts may
be res judicata,'0 this doctrine has no application to New Jersey
in as much as the state of New Jersey was in no sense a party
14 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, § 22.
15 Restatement of Conflict of Laws (P. F. Draft No. 1), § 15.
16 American Surety Co. v. Baldwin (1932), 53 Sp. Ct. 98; Baldwin v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn. (1931), 283 U. S. 522.
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to the proceedings in Pennsylvania and was thus not bound by
findings made in that case. Again, New Jersey is not required
to recognize the Pennsylvania decision if Pennsylvania had no
jurisdiction to impose the tax,17 and, of course, since jurisdiction
depends upon domicil, the finding of domicil by that court based
upon certain findings of fact as to the decedent's intention, is not,
as pointed out in the New Jersey decision, conclusive on it.
Therefore, while domicil is not a fact but a conclusion of law,
it is a conclusion resulting from certain highly important facts,
and in a case in which domicil is the jurisdictional point of con-
tact, the vital fact of the intention of the decedent to make his
home in any given place becomes a jurisdictional fact.
Since it is unconstitutional for any state to impose a tax with-
out jurisdiction so to do, it would seem that in any case where
domicil is thus involved as a jurisdictional prerequisite, the Su-
preme Court of the United States is bound to review the appli-
cation of the law determining domicil for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether the law has been properly applied.' 8 In the case
of inheritance taxes, it would seem that the Supreme Court is
bound to review such findings if properly presented, when made
by the state first attempting to impose a tax on the ground that
the decedent died domiciled there. Thus, it seems that the Penn-
sylvania decision was subject to review by the Supreme Court
quite as much as is the present decision of the New Jersey court.
It is true. that the Pennsylvania case was the first decision of a
court of last resort to uphold a tax in this case, but if the state
of Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction so to do because Dr. Dor-
rance was not domiciled there at his death, there is clearly a tak-
ing of property without due process of law quite as much as
when the court of New Jersey upholds the tax on the ground
that Dr. Dorrance was domiciled in that state at his death if
he was in fact not so domiciled. It can hardly be argued that the
first state to pass upon the question is immune from review by
the Supreme Court whereas states subsequently passing on the
question of domicil are subject to such review. While such a
distinction might almost be justified as a practical penalty for
delay in judicial proceedings, it is hardly a satisfactory legal
test in matters of such great importance.
'7 Tilt v. Kelsey (1907), 207 U. S. 43, 28 Sp. Ct. 1.
18 Restatement of Conflict of Laws (P. F. Draft No. 1), § 44.
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It has been repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States that the mere refusal to review a state decision
is not to be taken as of any significance in regard to the issues
of law involved in the case.' 9 Writs of certiorari are denied for
many reasons which in no way affect the merits of the case. In
the case of the appeal of the estate from the Pennsylvania de-
cision, the Supreme Court for some reason declined to review the
case, but it cannot be assumed that this refusal was because no
federal question was involved. The Supreme Court may decline
to review the decision of the New Jersey court, but again it can-
not be concluded that no federal question is involved. If Dr.
Dorrance's estate is unable to present the federal question clearly
involved in the matter, or, having presented it, if the Supreme
Court of the United States agrees with the Prerorgative Court of
New Jersey as to where Dr. Dorrance was domiciled at his death,
it will obviously be unfortunate for the beneficiaries of the es-
tate. But this may be merely the accidental penalty in a par-
ticular case of an attempt upon the part of a man of wealth
to enjoy the advantage of a domicil in one state at the price
exacted by another state.
FOwLE& V. HARPER.
Indiana University Law School,
Bloomington, Indiana.
19Pim v. St. Louis (1897), 165 U. S. 273, 17 Sp. Ct. 322; Live Oaks
Ass'n v. Railroad Comm. (1925) 269 U. S. 354, 46 Sp. Ct. 149; Appleby
v. Buffalo (1911), 221 U. S. 524, 31 Sp. Ct. 699. The opinion in the Penn-
sylvania case does not indicate that the executors claimed that a Constitu-
tional question was involved. The opinion of the Prerogative Court of New
Jersey indicates that probably such contention was raised in that case.
Of course, the record is the source of accurate information as to whether
a Federal right was claimed by the executors in either case. Rose, Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure (4th ed.) § 644.
